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NOTES AND COMMENTS
unlawful8 4 acts causing damage to the property prior to his avoidance of
the contract.3 5 The only relief available for the adult in the normal case
is the right to regain whatever remains in the minor's possession at the
time of disaffirmance.8 6
Surely the policy of the law should be to discourage rather than
countenance fraud, recklessness, and lawlessness in the adults of to-
morrow. Several states have met this problem with statutory pro-
visions8 7 requiring as a condition to disaffirmance that the infant, if over
eighteen at the inception of the contract, restore the consideration or pay
its equivalent to the party from whom it was received. This has the
effect of requiring the more mature infant to pay for the depreciation
and beneficial use and to account for any damages done to the property,
while at the same time preserving his right of avoidance. It is hoped
that our Legislature will consider enacting such a statute, in view of the
tremendous number of purchases of personalty made by minors today.
RICHARD VON BIBERSTEIN, JR.
Credit Transactions-Security Agreement Stipulating That on Sale of
the Security Property the Security Attaches to the Proceeds
In Presley E. Broum Lumber Co. v. Textile Banking Co.,' a furni-
ture manufacturer, who was financially impoverished, needed raw mate-
rials in the form of core stock, the base to which veneer is applied. The
plaintiff-lumber company had such stock to sell but was unwilling to
sell to the furniture manufacturer on credit. An agreement was reached
whereby the lumber company would consign the core stock to the furni-
ture manufacturer. Title to the raw materials was to remain in the
plaintiff until the finished product was sold, at which time the title to
the raw materials was to transfer over to the proceeds of sale, including
accounts receivable, in proportion to the value of the raw materials in
the finished product. The manufacturer was to be the agent to collect
the accounts and hold the funds in trust for the plaintiff. This agree-
"Taylor v. Fisher Motor Co., 249 N.C. 617, 107 S.E.2d 94 (1959).
Where a statute gives the adult an interest in the chattel, however, the infant
is liable for losses sustained through the minor's failure to notify the adult of the
chattel's seizure and sale under forfeiture proceedings. Williams v. Aldridge
Motors, Inc., 237 N.C. 352, 75 S.E.2d 237 (1953).
" McCormick v. Crotts, 198 N.C. 664, 153 S.E. 152 (1930) ; Hight v. Harris,
188 N.C. 328, 124 S.E. 623 (1924) ; Chandler v. Jones, 172 N.C. 569, 90 S.E. 580
(1916) ; Pippen v. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co., 130 N.C. 23, 40 S.E. 822 (1902).
A minor who avoided a compromise of his legacy has been required to account for
the property received under the compromise upon asserting a claim for the legacy.
Tipton v. Tipton, 48 N.C. 552 (1856).7 CAL. Cv. CoDD § 35 (1954) ; IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-103 (1948) ; MONT. Rrv.
CODES ANN. § 64-107 (1953); N.D. REv. CODE § 14-1011 (1943); OKLA. STAT.
Tit. 15, § 19 (1937) ; S.D. CODE § 43.0105 (1939).
2248 N.C. 308, 103 S.E.2d 334 (1958).
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ment was recorded. The core stock was furnished, the furniture was
produced and sold, and accounts receivable came into existence. The
furniture manufacturer, again in need of money, sold these accounts
receivable to the defendant banking company. In the face of the notice
provided by the recordation, the banking company collected the accounts
and refused to pay the proceeds to the plaintiff-lumber company.
The lumber company demanded the proceeds, without success, and
finally, in this action, sued for the proceeds alleging the agreement ex-
plained above. The trial court sustained a demurrer to the plaintiff's
cause of action and the Supreme Court on appeal affirmed on the ground
that this was a conditional sale of the lumber with permission in the
buyer to resell,2 that when the finished furniture was sold, all the plain-
tiff-lumber company had was a contractual right to payment from the
debtor or assignment by it of the proportion owed to plaintiff from the
sales.
The court pointed out that the 1945 Assignment of Accounts Re-
ceivable Act3 as it existed at the time this litigation was commenced was
applicable to "a presently subsisting right . . . under an existing con-
tract."4  Thus, the agreement here could not come under this act be-
cause the sales contracts giving rise to the accounts were not yet made
at the time of the attempted assignment of a proportion of the accounts
to arise from the sale of the furniture after it was manufactured. How-
ever, since 1957 the statute allows a creditor to accept an assignment of
accounts receivable which are to arise in the future.6
May a creditor of a prospective debtor who has unstable credit rela-
tions get a lien on the proceeds by stipulating in the security agreement
that on sale of the property the security attaches to the proceeds? It
seems he can obtain such a lien on proceeds through various routes.
One route is through the Factors' Lien Act.6 This act is designed
for a money lender who advances money on the security of raw materials,
goods in process, or finished goods. If the provisions of the act are
complied with, and the debtor then sells the security property in the
ordinary course of business, the lien attaches, without further act or
formality, to the proceeds of the sale, including accounts receivable.
However, this is limited to a creditor who advances money within the
terms of the act and is not extended to one who supplies raw materials
as did the plaintiff-lumber company.
'The court did not discuss why a valid consignment was not created. For a
collection of cases on consignments, see Annot., 63 A.L.R. 355, 368 (1929). Had
a valid consignment been created, the plaintiff-lumber company could have con-
trolled the proceeds.
I N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 44-77 to -85 (1950).
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 44-77 (1950).
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 44-77 (Supp. 1957).
'N.C. GEN. STAT §§ 44-70 to -76 (1950) as amended by N.C. GEN. STAT. §§
44-70 to -76 (Supp. 1957).
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Another route is through a trust receipt arrangement. Trust re-
ceipts are usually used in a three party transaction, as is typical in
the automobile wholesale business between the distant manufacturer,
the local bank, and the local dealer. Usually, a distant seller will for-
ward goods and their title or bill of lading to a local bank with good
credit standing and receive payment immediately. The bank then lets
the local buyer take the goods in return for a trust receipt. The holder
of the trust receipt has title to the goods until they are sold; when sold,
the title attaches to the proceeds. This type of arrangement is provided
for in Section 10 of the Uniform Trust Receipts Act.7
Another route would be through Section 9-306 of the Uniform
Commercial Codes which has now been enacted in Pennsylvania, 9
7 UxIFoRM TRUST REcEIPs ACT § 10 provides:
Where, under the terms of the trust receipt transaction, the trustee has no
liberty of sale or other disposition, or, having liberty of sale or other disposition,
is to account to the entruster for the proceeds or any disposition of the goods, docu-
ments or instruments, the entruster shall be entitled, to the extent to which and as
against all classes of persons as to whom his security interest was valid at the
time of disposition by the trustee, as follows:
(a) to the debts described in'Section 9 (3) ; and also(b) to any proceeds or the value of any proceeds (whether such proceeds are
identifiable or not) of goods, documents or instruments, if said proceeds were
received by the trustee within ten days prior to either application for appointment
of a receiver of the trustee, or the filing of a petition in bankuptcy or judicial in-
solvency proceedings by or against the trustee, or demand made by the entruster
for prompt accounting; and to a priority to the amount of such proceeds or value;
and also(c) to any other proceeds of the goods, documents or instruments which are
identifiable, unless the provision for accounting has been waived by the entruster by
words or conduct; and knowledge by the entruster of the existence of proceeds,
without demand for accounting made within ten days from such knowledge, shall
be deemed to be such a waiver.
8 Uniform Commercial Code § 9-306 provides in part:(2) "Except where this Article otherwise provides, a security interest con-
tinues in collateral notwithstanding sale, exchange or other disposition thereof by
the debtor unless his action was authorized by the secured party in the security
agreement or otherwise, and also continues in any identifiable proceeds including
collections received by the debtor.
(3) The security interest in proceeds is a continuously perfected security in-
terest if the interest in the original collateral was perfected but it ceases to be
perfected security interest and becomes unperfected ten days after receipt of the
proceeds by the debtor unless
(a) a filed financing statement covering the original collateral also covers
proceeds; or
(b) the security interest in the proceeds is perfected before the expiration
of the ten day period."
For a general outline on the effect of the code, see NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF
COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, CONNECTICUT ENACTS THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CoDE (1959); 21 OHIo BAR 1099 (1958). For a comparison of
the factors' lien acts with the UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, see Skilton, Factors
Lien on Merchandise, (1955) Wis. L. REv. 356. On the Uniform Commercial
Code in general, see Llewellyn, Why a Commercial Code? 22 TENN. L. REv. 779(1953) ; Symposium, 16 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROB. 1 (1951); Gilmore, On the
Difficulties of Codifying Commercial Law, 57 YALE L.J. 1321 (1947-48).
'Adopted in 1953. 21 OHIo BAR 1099, 1103 (1958).
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Massachusetts,10 Kentucky,"1 and Connecticut.1 2 This act replaces all
other acts relating to forms of security and authorizes under limitations
a lien on proceeds of any sale of security property. Section 9-306 of
the act is based on Section 10 of the Uniform Trust Receipts Act but
covers many other types of security arrangements.
Apart from statute, the common law in North Carolina hitherto has
apparently permitted one to obtain a lien on proceeds of resale of se-
curity property when the debtor assigns the future accounts receivable
to the creditor. This is subject to the qualification that if the creditor
permits the debtor to have the proceeds of the accounts receivable with-
out accounting for them or replacing the accounts with other accounts
of like quality and value, the assignment will be deemed fraudulent in
law under the rule of Benedict v. Ratner.18
Manufacturers Fin. Co. v. Armstrong,14 held that unless the debtor
had been accorded "unfettered dominion over the accounts and the
funds collected from them,"'1 the contract involved, which assigned
accounts receivable to arise in the future, was otherwise valid. Apply-
ing this case, the plaintiff-lumber company would have had a valid lien
on the proceeds of resale by the furniture manufacturer since the agree-
ment specifically provided that the proceeds were to be held in trust
and turned over to the creditor.
In In re Steele,'6 a mortgage of accounts receivable was held invalid
because "in effect it was agreed that the mortgagor might use the pro-
ceeds of collections on the accounts as he saw fit."' 7 The court said in
dictum that the chattel mortgage of accounts receivable due and to be-
come due was otherwise valid even as to the accounts to arise in the.
future. The same Assignment of Accounts Receivable Act was in effect
when this case was decided as when the contract between the plaintiff-
lumber company and the furniture manufacturer was entered and con-
tested. Applying the dictum of this case, the lumber company could
have recovered the accounts receivable from the banking company.
The security in the instant case was not invalid by reason of its after
acquired property feature. Hickson Lumber Co. v. Gay Lumber Co.18
is the leading case in North Carolina saying you can mortgage property
to be acquired in the future; in other words, that you can mortgage the
next cast of your net. The court in Hickson recognized the common
law rule "that nothing can be mortgaged that is not in existence and
10 Effective October 1, 1958. 21 OHIO BAR 1099, 1103 (1958).
1 Effective July 1, 1960. 21 OHIo BAR 1099, 1103 (1958).
"
2Effective October 31, 1961. NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON
UNIFORM STATE LAWS, CONNECTICUT ENACTS THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE(1959).
10268 U.S. 353 (1925). 1,78 F.2d 289 (4th Cir. 1935).
10 78 F.2d at 292. 10 122 F. Supp. 948 (E.D.N.C. 1954).
17 122 F. Supp. at 952. '. 150 N.C. 282, 63 S.E. 1045 (1909).
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does not at the time belong to the mortgagor, for a person can not
convey that which he does not own; but it is now well settled," the court
continued, "that equity will give effect to a contract to convey future-
acquired property, whether real or personal. Equity considers that
done which the mortgagor has agreed to do, and treats the mortgage as
already attaching to the newly acquired property as it comes into the
mortgagor's hands .... 19 In North Carolina a mortgage upon after-
acquired property, being enforceable inter partes, becomes, upon registra-
tion, valid, and enforceable against subsequent purchasers, because the
registration is an effectual notice as against the world."20
In the Presley E. Brown Lumber Co. case, since the agreement was
recorded and the court held it was a conditional sale, following Hickson
the plaintiff would have had a lien on the accounts receivable the in-
stant they came into existence by sale of the security property.
CONCLUSION
As has been shown above, except for the old Assignment of Accounts
Receivable Act, there seem to be no common law policy reasons in North
Carolina against allowing one to assign accounts receivable to arise in
the future.21 Whether the court was correct or incorrect in the Presley
E. Brown Lumber Co. case, the fact remains that clarification is needed
in this field.
In 1955, the General Assembly amended the Factors' Lien Act to
provide for a lien on proceeds of resale of security property by those who
advance money under the Act.22  In 1957, the General Assembly
amended the Assignment of Accounts Receivable Act to allow assign-
ments of accounts receivable which are not yet in existence.23 A third
step needs to be taken by the General Assembly to enact a statute
authorizing security agreements which provide for a transfer of the lien
from the security property to the accounts receivable or other proceeds
arising from its sale. Or a statute could be enacted following the model
of Section 9-306 of the Uniform Commercial Code.24
MAx D. BALLINGER
10 150 N.C. at 286, 63 S.E. at 1047. 20 150 N.C. at 288, 63 S.E. at 1048.
"
1For cases approving this policy in other jurisdictions, see McIntyre v. Hauser,
131 Cal. 11, 63 Pac. 69 (1900) ; Liddle v. Hernandez, 72 Colo. 585, 211 Pac. 821(1923); Lathrop v. Schlauger, 113 Neb. 14, 201 N.W. 654 (1924); Brookside
Granite Co. v. Latty, 83 N.Y. Misc. 384, 144 N.Y. Supp. 1042 (1913) ; James River
Bank v. Hansen, 51 S.D. 13, 211 N.W. 976 (1927) ; Kramer v. Burlage, 234 Wis.
538, 291 N.W. 766 (1940); Carpenter v. Forbes, 211 Wis. 648, 247 N.W. 857
(1933) ; Black Hawk State Bank v. Accola, 194 Wis. 29, 215 N.W. 433 (1927);
Annot., Agreement or order to pay obligation out of the proceeds of any sale or
mortgage that may be made as creating an equitable mortgage, 101 A.L.R. 81, 87(1936).22 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 44-73 (Supp. 1957).
2 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 44-77 (Supp. 1957).
"4 See note 8 supra.
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